Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action
Joshua Gert
This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.
Anno:
2004
Casa editrice:
Cambridge University Press
Lingua:
english
Pagine:
246
ISBN 10:
0521833183
ISBN 13:
9780521833189
Collana:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
File:
PDF, 1.09 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2004
Amazon 
Barnes & Noble 
Bookshop.org 
Converti i file
Più risultati di ricerca
Altri vantaggi 
Termini più frequenti
Liste di libri correlati
